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THE EMERGENCY EXCEPTION TO THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT
Ronald J. Bacigal*
Although an emergency or exigent circumstance is frequently
cited as one justification for a search without a warrant,' "the con-
tours of this exception have not developed and. . . [the Supreme
Court] . . .has never pinned it down to a workable and effective
meaning. '2 Some of the ambiguity surrounding the emergency ex-
ception is attributable to the use of the single term "emergency" to
embody several distinct concepts. An emergency can be defined
broadly as the basic justification for all warrantless searches, 3 or it
may refer to a single type of warrantless search separate and distinct
from other recognized warrantless searches.4 Even the latter concept
of "emergency" leads to confusion because it ignores the courts' de
facto distinction between emergencies involving a potential loss of
life (emergency intrusions), and emergencies involving a potential
loss of evidence (emergency searches).5
* Professor of Law, T.C. Williams School of Law; B.S., Concord College, 1964; LL.B.,
Washington and Lee University, 1967.
1. "Although the emergency exception has never been definitively explained by the Su-
preme Court, it has been consistently recognized and applied by the lower courts to a myriad
of factual situations." Mascolo, The Emergency Doctrine Exception to the Warrant Require-
ment Under the Fourth Amendment, 22 BuFF. L. REv. 419-20 (1973). It is frequently con-
tended that the emergency exception originated in Justice Jackson's dictum in Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14-15 (1948): "There are exceptional circumstances in which, on
balancing the need for effective law enforcement against the right of privacy, it may be
contended that a magistrate's warrant for search may be dispensed with."
2. United States v. Goldenstein, 456 F.2d 1006, 1015 (8th Cir. 1972) (dissenting opinion).
3. Absent some grave emergency, the Fourth Amendment has interposed a magis-
trate between the citizen and the police. . . .The Constitution requires a magistrate
to pass on the desires of the police before they violate the privacy of the home. We
cannot be true to that constitutional requirement and excuse the absence of a search
warrant without a showing by those who seek exemption from the constitutional man-
date that the exigencies of the situation made that course imperative. McDonald v.
United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-56 (1948).
4. The generally recognized situations where a warrant is not required are: consent,
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); search incident to arrest, Chimel v. Califor-
nia, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); stop and frisk, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); automobiles,
Cardwell v. Lewis, 414 U.S. 813 (1974); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); and plain
view, Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
5. The term "emergency intrusion" is the author's and has not been used by the courts.
The courts use the-general term "emergency" to apply to both an emergency search and an
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Both an emergency intrusion and an emergency search have in
common a concern for the time element, i.e., an immediate intru-
sion into a constitutionally protected area is required or a given
result is likely to occur. What distinguishes an emergency search
from an emergency intrusion is the result that will occur if the police
fail to take immediate action. Perhaps the most straightforward
statement of the distinction was put forth by Justice Jackson:
If we assume, for example, that a child is kidnaped and the officers
throw a roadblock about the neighborhood and search every outgoing
car, it would be a drastic and undiscriminating use of the search. The
officers might be unable to show probable cause for searching any
particular car. However, I should candidly strive hard to sustain such
an action, executed fairly and in good faith, because it might be
reasonable to subject travelers to that indignity if it was the only way
to save a threatened life and detect a vicious crime. But I should not
strain to sustain such a roadblock and universal search to salvage a
few bottles of bourbon and catch a bootlegger.'
In an emergency search the police are serving their criminal inves-
tigation function by conducting a quest for incriminating evidence.
In an emergency intrusion the police are discharging their common
law function of preserving life or protecting property.7 Many courts
have agreed with Justice Jackson that there is a difference in the
quality of the two functions and that it is proper "to strive hard to
sustain" an intrusion for the noble purpose of protecting life, while
there is less need to uphold an intrusion designed to serve the pur-
pose of criminal investigation.8 Putting aside subjective reactions to
emergency intrusion. But see Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 212 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 860 (1963), where then Judge Burger used the term "civil emergency."
6. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 183 (1949) (dissenting opinion).
7. See People v. Roberts, 47 Cal. 2d 374, 303 P.2d 721 (1956), where the court held that
"[nlecessity often justifies an action . ..where the act is prompted by the motive of
preserving life or property .... " 303 P.2d at 723. See also United States v. Barone, 330 F.2d
543 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1004 (1964): "The right of the police to enter and
investigate in an emergency without the accompanying intent to either search or arrest is
inherent in the very nature of their duties as peace officers, and derives from the common
law." Id. at 545 (emphasis added).
8. See, e.g., People v. Hyde, - Cal. 3d _ , 524 P.2d 830, 840, 115 Cal. Rptr. 358, 368
(1974) (concurring opinion), where, in dealing with airport searches, it was observed that "we
deal with a type of official conduct that. . . has objectives qualitatively different from those
of the conventional search and seizure in the criminal context. . . . "See also Terry v. Ohio,
[Vol. 9:249250
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a search for a kidnapped child versus a search for bootleg liquor, this
article will examine whether the purpose behind an intrusion upon
the right to privacy should have any effect in judging its constitu-
tionality. The purpose behind the intrusion has possible relevance
at three points in analyzing the fourth amendment: 1. Is the purpose
of the intrusion relevant in determining the applicability of the
fourth amendment? 2. Is the purpose of the intrusion relevant in
determining its reasonableness under the fourth amendment? 3. Is
the purpose of the intrusion relevant in determining whether the
intrusion is an exception to the warrant clause of the fourth amend-
ment?
I. Is THE PURPOSE OF THE INTRUSION RELEVANT IN DETERMINING THE
APPLICABILITY OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT?
Since an emergency search is defined as a quest for incriminating
evidence, any intrusion into a constitutionally protected area in
furtherance of the quest clearly meets the traditional definition of
a search under the fourth amendment While the fourth amend-
ment is always applicable to an emergency search, it is possible, by
narrowly defining the term search, to characterize an emergency
intrusion as being totally outside the coverage of the fourth amend-
ment. 0 The fourth amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and
prescribes conditions for issuing a search warrant."1 If one contends
that an emergency intrusion is not a quest for incriminating evi-
dence and therefore not a search at all, then the entire fourth
amendment is inapplicable and there is no need to consider the
warrant clause, the requirement of probable cause, or the reason-
392 U.S. 1 (1968), where the Court recognized the need to protect the physical safety of police
officers and noted: "We are now concerned with more than the government interest in investi-
gating crime. . . . " Id. at 23 (emphasis added).
9. See notes 12-18 infra and accompanying text.
10. "There never has been any doubt that a policeman or fireman is privileged to enter
private premises in the discharge of his public duty. [citations omitted]. I see no connection
between the law of search warrants and the law pdrmitting a policeman to enter a private
dwelling in certain emergencies." State v. Sutton, 454 S.W.2d 481, 494-95 (Mo. 1970) (dis-
senting opinion).
11. The full text of the fourth amendment states: "The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
1975]
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ableness of the intrusion." Before Camara v. Municipal Court,,3 it
was certainly possible to argue that a search could be narrowly
defined as a quest for incriminating evidence. For example, one
court stated that a "search implies an examination of one's premises
or person with a view to the discovery of contraband or evidence of
guilt to be used in prosecution of a criminal action." 4 Under such a
narrow definition, the constitutionality of the intrusion could turn
wholly on the factual question of the purpose of the intrusion. If the
purpose was to obtain evidence for criminal prosecution then the
intrusion was a search and the fourth amendment is applicable. But
if the purpose was to protect life or property, then the intrusion was
not a search and the fourth amendment is inapplicable. The case
of Root v. Gauper'5 illustrates how a factual determination of the
purpose may decide the applicability of the fourth amendment.
In Root the victim telephoned an operator saying that his wife had
shot him and that he needed an ambulance. The operator connected
the victim with an ambulance driver, who in turn notified the town
marshall. The ambulance driver proceeded to the victim's house
and radioed the marshall and the sheriff that he had removed the
victim and was taking him to the hospital. The marshall arrived at
the victim's home and waited outside for several minutes until the
sheriff arrived. The two officers then entered, seized a shotgun and
shells, and took several photos. All of the items were offered in
evidence. After holding that the police intrusion could not be justi-
fied on grounds of consent or plain view, the court considered the
applicability of the emergency doctrine. The court recognized that
''police officers may enter a dwelling without a warrant to render
emergency aid and assistance to a person whom they reasonably
believe to be in distress and in need of that assistance.""6 Aplying
12. See, e.g., United States v. Gravitt, 484 F.2d 375 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1135 (1974), where the court upheld an inventory/search of an automobile because the pur-
pose of the intrusion was ". . . the police interest in protecting the property of the accused
and in protecting themselves. It was not an interest in gathering evidence, such as seizing
contraband or dangerous weapons. That is usually involved when a search is made on the
basis of a warrant or on grounds that there exists probable cause combined with exigent
circumstances. Where interests of the former kind are involved, it is, of course, of no conse-
quence whether or not there was probable cause." Id. at 380 n.5 (emphasis added).
13. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
14. Haerr v. United States, 240 F.2d 533, 535 (5th Cir. 1957).
15. 438 F.2d 361 (8th Cir. 1971).
16. Id. at 364.
[Vol. 9:249
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an "objective standard as to the reasonableness of the officer's be-
lief,"" the court found that the knowledge that the victim had been
removed, and the fact that the marshall waited for the sheriff rather
than entering immediately, were not consistent with a motive to
assist an injured person. Instead, the facts suggested "that the pur-
pose of entering the house was to obtain evidence relating to the
commission of the crime."' 18 Thus, once the court factually ascer-
tained the purpose of the intrusion, the applicability of the fourth
amendment was automatically determined. 9
The view that the fourth amendment affords protection only
against a search for inci iminating evidence ignores the broader
purpose of the fourth amendment and reduces it to an adjunct of
the fifth amendment. The fourth amendment has been viewed as
serving a dual purpose: (1) to preserve the fifth amendment right
against self-incrimination from being compromised through viola-
tions of the fourth amendment; 0 and (2) to protect the citizen's
right to be free of unwarranted governmental invasion of privacy.'
In Frank v. Maryland" the Supreme Court viewed the fourth
amendment as primarily concerned with searches for evidence of
crime,23 while the right of privacy was a "less intense" right which
could be set aside by general considerations such as the purpose of
the intrusion.2 The Frank distinction between searches for incrimi-
17. Id.
18. Id. at 365.
19. See also United States v. Goldenstein, 456 F.2d 1006 (8th Cir. 1972).
20. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), where the Court discussed the intimate rela-
tionship between the fourth and fifth amendments. Cf. Chief Justice Burger's dissent in
Bivens v. Six Unknovm Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
21. The basic premise of the prohibition against searches was not protection against
self-incrimination; it was the common law right of a man to privacy in his home ....
It was not related to crime or to suspicion of crime. . . . To say that a man suspected
of crime has a right to protection against search of his home without a warrant, but
that a man not suspected of crime has no such protection, is a fantastic absurdity.
District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 13, 16-17 (D.C. Cir. 1949), afl'd, 339 U.S. 1
(1950).
22. 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
23. In Frank, id., the purpose of the attempted intrusion was to inspect for violations of
the health code. The Court held that this was not a search within the meaning of the fourth
amendment.
24. Cases since Frank have recognized that the right to privacy has constitutional status
independent of the fifth amendment. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
(right to privacy guaranteed by the penumbras of the first, third, fourth, fifth and ninth
amendments).
1975]
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nating evidence and searches for other purposes was overruled in
Camara, 1 where the Supreme Court stated: "It is surely anomalous
to say that the individual and his private property are fully pro-
tected by the Fourth Amendment only when the individual is sus-
pected of criminal behavior. ' 2 Under Camara an intrusion by gov-
ernment authorities not concerned with obtaining incriminating
evidence is still a search within the meaning of the fourth amend-
ment. If the Camara definition of a search is accepted then there is
no need to distinguish an emergency search (intrusion for criminal
investigation) from an emergency intrusion (civil intrusion). How-
ever, the doctrine of a civil intrusion for non-criminal matters as
separate and distinct from a search under the fourth amendment,
did not die a final death in Camara. The theory that a civil intrusion
is beyond the coverage of the fourth amendment has resurfaced from
time to time, most recently in the case of Wyman v. James.2
In Wyman a welfare mother (Mrs. James) was notified that pur-
suant to state law, welfare workers were to visit her home. Mrs.
James refused them permission to enter her home and was notified
that such refusal would mean that all welfare assistance would be
terminated. Mrs. James filed a civil rights suit seeking declaratory
and injunctive relief. The first issue before the Court was whether
home visits by welfare workers constituted searches under the
fourth amendment. 28 The lower court had not distinguished a civil
intrusion from a search for incriminating evidence, but rather held
that "any unauthorized physical penetration into the premises oc-
cupied by plaintiff is a search. 29 The Supreme Court paid homage
to the tradition of jealous protection of fourth amendment rights,
then declared the tradition irrelevant to the facts of Wyman "for the
seemingly obvious and simple reason that we are not concerned here
with any search . . . in the Fourth Amendment meaning of that
25. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
26. Id. at 530.
27. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
28. The Court held that the "visits" were not searches under the fourth amendment.
However, the Court held in the alternative that if the visits were searches, they were nonethe-
less reasonable under the fourth amendment. For a discussion of the alternative holding see
text accompanying notes 46-48 infra.
29. James v. Goldberg, 303 F. Supp. 935, 940 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). The district court went on
to state that "like most of the Bill of Rights, the Fourth Amendment was not designed to be
a shelter for criminals, but a basic protection for everyone . . . . "Id. at 941.
[Vol. 9:249
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term."3 Although the Court recognized the possibility that a "visit"
by welfare officials -could uncover evidence of fraud and lead to a
possible criminal prosecution, it felt that the prime purpose of the
visit was not investigative in a criminal sense: "It is . . .true that
the caseworker's posture. . . is perhaps, in a sense, both rehabilita-
tive and investigative. But this latter aspect, we think, is given too
broad a character and far more emphasis than it deserves if it is
equated with a search in the traditional criminal law context. '31
A search "in the traditional criminal law context" is a quest for
incriminating evidence.32 Thus, under the holding of Wyman a gov-
ernment intrusion for a purpose other than criminal investigation
is simply not a search at all and the fourth amendment is totally
inapplicable. The purpose behind the intrusion could be a "noble"
community interest (e.g., public welfare) as in Wyman, or it could
be a very narrow interest as in Harris v. United States,3 where the
Supreme Court upheld a warrantless "inventory" of an automobile
for the purpose of protecting the police from civil liability for the
mishandling of private property.34 Harris indicates that it is not
necessary to characterize the purpose of the intrusion as noble or as
serving a broad community interest. The important factor is to
characterize the purpose as other than a quest for incriminating
evidence. Once the intrusion is so characterized the fourth amend-
ment is deemed inapplicable.
The reasoning in Wyman and Harris represents a dramatic step
back from the holding in Camara. If the Supreme Court still adheres
to the Camara principle that the fourth amendment protects not
merely the fifth amendment right against self-incrimination, but
also the right of privacy against government intrusion, then it is
inconceivable that the coverage of the fourth amendment should
turn upon the subjective motivation of the intruding governmental
officials.15 Indeed, the "right of privacy is not conditioned upon the
30. 400 U.S. 309, 317 (1971).
31. Id. (emphasis added).
32. See notes 12-18 supra and accompanying text.
33. 390 U.S. 234 (1968).
34. In Harris, id., the Supreme Court approved "the precise and detailed findings of the
District Court, accepted by the Court of Appeals,. . . to the effect that the discovery of the
[seized item] was not the result of a search of the car, but of a measure taken to protect the
car while it was in police custody. Nothing in the Fourth Amendment requires the police to
obtain a warrant in these narrow circumstances." Id. at 236.
35. ". . .[T]he scope of the Fourth Amendment is not determined by the subjective
1975]
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objective, the prerogative or the stature of the intruding officer
S. .. It is immaterial whether he is motivated by the highest pub-
lic purpose or by the lowest personal spite." 6 The purpose of an
intrusion, whether it be a quest for evidence (emergency search) or
protection of life (emergency intrusion), delineates the proper scope
of the search but it should not determine the applicability of the
fourth amendment.
The danger of confusing the scope of a search with the applicabil-
ity of the fourth amendment was illustrated in Terry v. Ohio,3"
where the government argued that a frisk was merely a "petty in-
dignity" and not a search within the meaning of the fourth amend-
ment. The Terry decision noted how "an overly technical definition
of 'search' " had led the lower court to "the position that the Consti-
tution must, in the name of necessity, be held to permit unre-
strained rummaging about a person and his effects upon mere suspi-
cion."38 The Court held that while a frisk is narrow in scope, it is
nonetheless a search within the meaning of the fourth amendment.
The purpose of a frisk (safety) is very narrow, and accordingly the
scope of the frisk (pat-down outer clothing for weapons) is narrow. 9
But the narrow purpose and scope of a frisk does not reduce it to a
non-search beyond the coverage of the fourth amendment. Terry
held that "the sounder course is to recognize that the Fourth
Amendment governs all intrusions by agents of the public upon
personal security."4 Thus when the police pat-down a suspect for
weapons and find none, but then conduct a "full-blown search" for
evidence, the latter search is improper not because the change in the
police purpose has converted a non-search to a search, but because
the police have exceeded the proper scope of what was initially a
search under the fourth amendment.
If Camara and Terry have not been overruled sub silentio then the
conclusion of the law enforcement officer." United States v. Resnick, 455 F.2d 1127, 1132 (5th
Cir. 1972).
36. District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 13, 17 (D.C. Cir. 1949), aff'd, 339 U.S. 1 (1950).
37. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
38. Id. at 18 n.15.
39. Concurring in Terry, Justice Harlan noted that the policeman "is entitled, for the
protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer
clothing of. . .persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault
him." Id. at 30.
40. Id. at 18 n.15 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 9:249
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proper definition of a search is any government intrusion into an
area protected by the right to privacy. Under this definition, the
purpose of the government intrusion is irrelevant in determining the
applicability of the fourth amendment and there is thus no need,
in determining whether police actions constitute a search, to distin-
guish between an emergency search and an emergency intrusion.
H. Is THE PURPOSE OF THE INTRUSION RELEVANT IN DETERMINING ITS
REASONABLENESS, UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT?
If it is admitted that an intrusion not designed to uncover incrimi-
nating evidence is nonetheless a search, then the question for con-
sideration is, whether the purpose of the intrusion makes the war-
rantless search reasonable under the fourth amendment?
The fourth amendment consists of two conjunctive clauses: the
reasonableness clause, which protects against unreasonable
searches and seizures, and the warrant clause, which prescribes
conditions for the issuance of a warrant.4 The proper relationship
between these two clauses has been the subject of much debate
centering on whether the clauses are dependent or independent of
each other. One theory views the clauses as dependent and comple-
mentary; thus making warrantless searches unreasonable except in
emergency situations when resort to a magistrate is impossible. 2
The second theory views the warrant and reasonableness clauses as
independent and severable; thus searches without a warrant are
judged solely by the standard of reasonableness, and the failure to
obtain a warrant is not relevant." At times the Supreme Court has
embraced the theory of dependence,44 while at other times accepting
41. The full text of the fourth amendment is set out in note 11 supra.
42. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950),
stated:
When the Fourth Amendment outlawed "unreasonable searches" and then went on to
define the very restricted authority that even a search warrant issued by a magistrate
could give, the framers said with all the clarity of the gloss of history that a search is
"unreasonable" unless a warrant authorizes it, barring only exceptions justified by
absolute necessity. Id. at 70.
43. In Rabinowitz, the majority rejected Justice Frankfurter's view, and held that: "The
relevant test is not whether it is reasonable to procure a search warrant, but whether the
search was reasonable." Id. at 66.
44. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
19751
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the theory of independence. 45 One Justice has remarked that "[t]he
several cases on this subject [in the Supreme Court] . ..cannot
be satisfactorily reconciled. This problem has, as is well known,
provoked strong and fluctuating differences of view on the Court."46
In order to determine whether it is pertinent to distinguish an emer-
gency intrusion from an emergency search,.it must first be deter-
mined whether a warrantless search is to be judged under the rea-
sonableness standard or under the warrant clause.
Under the reasonableness standard the distinction between an
emergency intrusion and an emergency search could determine the
constitutionality of the search. For example, although the primary
holding of Wyman is that the non-criminal purpose of the intrusion
made it a non-search,47 the Court stated, in the alternative holding,
that if the intrusion were considered a search it was not unconstitu-
tional because it "does not descend to the level of unreason-
ableness."48 The Wyman opinion listed eleven factors which led the
Court to conclude that the search was not unreasonable. These fac-
tors basically consisted of stating the non-criminal interests the
public wished served by such intrusions." Thus, at least in dicta,
45. See, e.g., Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339
U.S. 56 (1950).
46. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 235 (1960). It is questionable if the "differences of
view" are as great in practice as they appear to be in theory. For even when the Court has
stated that reasonableness is the ultimate standard for a search under the fourth amendment,
this has not meant that the warrant clause is completely irrelevant in judging the constitu-
tionality of the search. Under the reasonableness standard the failure to comply with the
warrant clause is not, in and of itself, determinative of the constitutionality of the search.
Rather, the existence of the warrant procedure is relevant as one factor to consider in deter-
mining what is a reasonable search. Thus in Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973),
quoting, Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967), the Court could state that,
on the one hand: "The ultimate standard set forth in the Fourth Amendment is reasonable-
ness. In construing this command, there has been general agreement that 'except in certain
carefully defined classes of cases, a search of private property without proper consent is
'unreasonable' unless it has been authorized by a valid search warrant.' Id. at 439. On the
other hand the Court went on to hold that the warrantless search "was not unreasonable
solely because a warrant had not been obtained." 413 U.S. at 448 (emphasis added). But cf.
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), where the plurality opinion stated that the
warrant requirement "is not an inconvenienceto be somehow 'weighed' against the claims of
police efficiency." Id. at 481.
47. See text accompanying notes 30-31 supra.
48. 400 U.S. 309, 318 (1971).
49. E.g., "The public's interest in . . .assistance to the unfortunate .... " Id. at 318;
"The visit is not one by police or uniformed authority." Id. at 322; ". . . the [welfare]
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the Wyman decision does recognize the purpose of a search as one
factor in determining its reasonableness. More precisely on point is
the decision in Cady v. Dombrowski,5 where the Supreme Court
upheld a warrantless search on the ground that the purpose of the
police was to perform "community caretaking functions, totally di-
vorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence
relating to the violation of a criminal statute."5
Dombrowski involved the arrest of an off duty policeman for driv-
ing while intoxicated. The car he was driving was towed to a garage
and the police "inventoried" the auto for the purpose of removing
the police revolver the defendant was believed to have been carry-
ing. In the process the police discovered blood-stained objects which
led to the defendant's conviction for murder. In oral argument the
state put forth the argument addressed in Part I of this article, that
the intrusion was not a search and was thus proper under Wyman
and Harris.52 The Court did not rule upon the definition of a search
"[i]nasmuch as we believe that Harris and other decisions control
this case even if the intrusion is characterized as a search . . .-.
The Court took note of the "specific motivation" of the intruding
officer which was a "concern for the safety of the general public who
might be endangered if an intruder removed a revolver from the
trunk of the vehicle,"54 and held that this purpose justified the
search as constitutionally reasonable.5
It is possible to argue that Dombrowski and the alternative hold-
ing of Wyman are reincarnations of the overruled doctrine of Frank
v. Maryland5 -that warrantless civil intrusions are constitutional,
while warrantless intrusions for criminal investigation are unconsti-
tutional. 57 The analysis in Frank differs from the analysis in
Dombrowski, but the result is the same. Under Frank an intrusion
program concerns dependent children and the needy families of those children. It does not
deal with crime or with the actual or suspected perpetrators of crime." Id. at 323; "The home
visit is not a criminal investigation .. Id. at 323.
50. 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
51. Id. at 441.
52. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971); Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968).
53. 413 U.S. 433, 442 (1973).
54. Id. at 447.
55. Id.
56. 359 U.S. 360 (1959). See text accompanying notes 22-25 supra.
57. One commentator has interpreted the holding in Dombrowski to be "that warrants are
not required for searches conducted with a benign purpose. This holding is equivalent to the
1975]
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for a purpose other than criminal investigation is labelled a non-
search and thus constitutional; while under Dombrowski such an
intrusion is labelled a search, but reasonable and thus constitu-
tional. It is uncertain whether Dombrowski resurrects the previously
overruled Frank decision, because the reasonableness standard is
nebulous, and because the Dombrowski holding does not identify
the non-criminal purpose of the search as the controlling factor.
Both Dombrowski and the alternative holding of Wyman note the
absence of criminal investigation, but they also consider the general
public interest in the intrusion. The Supreme Court has not dealt
with a situation where the warrantless intrusion was designed to
serve both a broad public interest and the purpose of criminal inves-
tigation.
Such a situation confronted the Supreme Court of California in
the case of People v. Sirhan.5 In Sirhan, the facts showed that
Senator Robert Kennedy, a candidate for the Democratic Presiden-
tial nomination, was shot on the evening of June 4, 1968. The assas-
sin was captured but refused to reveal any information, including
his identity. On the morning of June 5, 1968, defendant's brothers,
Adel and Munir, contacted the police after seeing a newspaper pho-
tograph of the defendant in connection with the Kennedy
assassination. Adel Sirhan advised the police of the defendant's
identity and stated that he (Adel) and his two brothers, Sirhan and
Munir, lived with their mother at a specified address. When asked
to consent to a search of the home, Adel replied that "'as far as he
was concerned [the police] could, however it was his mother's
house.' "5 At 10:30 a.m. the police entered the Sirhan house, with-
out a warrant, to search for" 'evidence of possible conspiracy in that
there might be other people that were not yet in custody.' '10 In the
defendant's bedroom the police found a diary which was introduced
in evidence at the trial." The court held that the search was not a
statement that the warrant requirement contained in the second clause of the fourth amend-
ment applies only to criminal investigations." Note, Warrantless Searches and Seizures of
Automobiles, 87 HARv. L. RaV. 835, 850-51 (1974).
58. 7 Cal. 3d 710, 497 P.2d 1121, 102 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1972).
59. Id. at 735, 497 P.2d at 1137, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 401. Mrs. Sirhan was the sole owner of
the house.
60. Id. at 736, 497 P.2d at 1138, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 402. At trial the police testified that there
was nothing that indicated that the defendant was part of a conspiracy, but there was also
no evidence that "there was not a conspiracy." Id.
61. At trial the defense did not object to the introduction of the diary on grounds that it
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valid consent search because the person consenting did not have
authority over the area searched. The government then argued that
the warrantless search was justified because it fell within the emer-
gency exception. 2 Although admittedly conducted for the purpose
of obtaining incriminating evidence, the court held the search to be
reasonable because it also served the community interest in dispel-
ling any potential panic that could follow a political assassination:
The crime was one of enormous gravity, and the "gravity of the
offense" is an appropriate factor to take into consideration.
[citations omitted]. The victim was a major presidential candidate,
and a crime of violence had already been committed against him. The
crime thus involved far more than idle threats. Although the officers
did not have reasonable cause to believe that the house contained
evidence of a conspiracy to assassinate prominent political leaders,
we believe that the mere possibility that there might be such evidence
in the house fully warranted the officers' actions. It is not difficult to
envisage what would have been the effect on this nation if several
more political assassinations had followed that of Senator Kennedy. 3
Thus the California court in Sirhan upheld a search without a war-
rant and without probable cause, solely on the basis that the com-
munity interest made the search reasonable.
Sirhan is similar to Dombrowski in that the police were serving a
broad public interest (i.e., attempting to thwart a possible conspir-
acy to assassinate prominent political leaders). However, unlike
Dombrowski, the police in Sirhan were also concerned with obtain-
ing incriminating evidence on a particular suspect. The applica-
bility of Dombrowski to Sirhan can only be determined if one can
was "communicative" or "testimonial" in nature, so that its very nature might preclude it
from being the object of a reasonable search and seizure. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S.
294, 302-03 (1967). Thus the issue was waived and not considered on appeal. People v. Sirhan,
7 Cal. 3d at 740, 497 P.2d at 1141, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 405 (1972).
62. The only discussion of whether there was time to obtain a search warrant consists of
the following footnote by the court: "Brandt [the searching officer] testified that he con-
ferred with his superior officer regarding a search of the home and was advised 'to search the
home if we had consent of... Adel.' The foregoing, however, does not show that the officers
did not believe there was an emergency. Rather they appear to have been acting with abun-
dant caution." 7 Cal. 3d 710, 739 n.17, 497 P.2d 1121, 1140 n.17, 102 Cal. Rptr. 385, 404 n.17
(1972).
63. 7 Cal. 3d 710, 739, 497 P.2d 1121, 1140, 102 Cal. Rptr. 385, 404 (1972).
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identify what specifically made the warrantless search in
Dombrowski reasonable. Was it the presence of concern for the gen-
eral community (which was present in both Dombrowski and
Sirhan), or was it the absence of a concern for incriminating a spe-
cific suspect (which was present in Sirhan but absent in
Dombrowski)? The Dombrowski opinion provides no guidance as to
what specific factors made the warrantless search reasonable. In
defining the reasonableness standard, Justice Rehnquist merely
stated that:
The Framers of the Fourth Amendment have given us only the gen-
eral standard of "unreasonableness" as a guide in determining
whether searches and seizures meet the standard of that Amendment
in those cases where a warrant is not required. Very little that has
been said in our previous decisions [citations omitted] . . . and very
little that we might say here can usefully refine the language of the
Amendment itself in order to evolve some detailed formula for judg-
ing cases such as this."4
Because the reasonableness standard is so vague, the courts are
free to consider and weigh, in some unspecified manner, any num-
ber of factors. Such factors could include the purpose of the search,
thereby necessitating the distinction between an emergency intru-
sion and an emergency search. In a given situation a court applying
the reasonableness standard would be free to conclude that the
purpose behind an emergency intrusion was sufficiently in the com-
munity interest so as to make a warrantless search reasonable, but
the purpose of an emergency search was not sufficiently in the com-
munity interest to justify the absence of a warrant. The problem
with such an approach is that there are no standards upon which a
court can decide that a certain purpose is or is not sufficiently in
the community interest to make the search reasonable without a
warrant. As the Wyman dissent noted: "in determining whether a
search is reasonable, this Court is not free merely to balance, in a
totally ad hoc fashion, any number of subjective factors." 5 On a
practical level the government can always contend that the search
served some community interest, other than merely obtaining in-
criminating evidence. 6 For example, the police may admit that they
64. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 448 (1973).
65. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 341 (1971) (dissenting opinion).
66. One Justice has recognized this tendency: "We must remember that the extent of any
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seized heroin as evidence for a criminal prosecution but they may
contend that their purpose was also to keep the heroin from falling
into the hands of school children. It would be a very rare situation
where it could be factually established that the police had abso-
lutely no motive other than to obtain incriminating evidence on a
suspect. Even then, the police could always argue that the com-
munity interest was served by obtaining incriminating evidence,
thereby increasing the chances of conviction and imprisonment,
thus removing a criminal from society. Of course the courts do not
have to accept such tenuous reasoning, but under the reasonable-
ness test there is no standard to separate a tenuous community
interest from a valid community interest.
The suggested way to eliminate the vagueness of the reasonable-
ness test is to recognize the primacy of the warrant clause. Such an
approach would recognize that although the purpose of the search
(e.g., community interest) may prevail over the right to privacy by
establishing probable cause to search, it is an entirely separate ques-
tion as to whether the purpose of the search can prevail over the
warrant requirement. The language of Camara is appropriate in
correctly framing the issue:
[Ain argument that the public interest demands a particular rule
must receive careful consideration. But we think this argument
misses the mark. The question is not, at this stage at least, whether
these [intrusions] may be made, but whether they may be made
without a warranty
If the government contends that the purpose of an emergency intru-
sion was to provide assistance to an injured person, this does no
more than establish that the public interest justifies the issuance of
a search warrant." To concede that there is a public interest in the
purpose of the search concedes that there is probable cause to con-
duct the search, but it does not concede that the search may be
conducted without a warrant." The bypassing of the warrant proce-
privilege of search and seizure without warrant which we sustain, the officers interpret and
apply themselves and will push to the limit." Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 182
(1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
67. 387 U.S. 523, 533 (1967).
68. "If a valid public interest justifies the intrusion contemplated, then there is probable
cause to issue a suitably restricted search warrant." Id. at 539.
69. "Belief, however well founded, that an article sought is concealed in a dwelling house
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dure is a totally separate question that does not require an inquiry
into the purpose of the search.
When the warrant clause is applicable, a warrantless search is
constitutional only if the government can meet two separate tests.
First, was there a legitimate government interest in searching, suffi-
cient to prevail over the right to privacy? There is no need to distin-
guish an emergency search from an emergency intrusion, because
the government's interest in criminal investigation and the interest
in protecting life are both legitimate interests, and, if based on a
reasonable belief, probable cause to search exists. At this point the
government interest must be identified as legitimate and reason-
able, but there is no need to further categorize the interest as civil
or criminal investigation. The second test the government must
meet is whether there were grounds for bypassing the warrant proce-
dure. Under Camara the only ground for bypassing the warrant
procedure is when "the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to
frustrate the governmental purpose behind the search."' " There is
no need to distinguish an emergency search from an emergency
intrusion because the likelihood of frustrating the search does not
turn upon the nature of the government's purpose. Whether the
purpose of the search is to obtain incriminating evidence or to pre-
serve life,'the purpose is frustrated only when the delay to obtain a
warrant would make a subsequent search meaningless. That is, in
the time required to obtain a search warrant, some event (e.g.,
destruction of sought after evidence, or loss of an imperiled life) will
occur which will make the search fruitless. Thus the only proper
justification for bypassing the warrant procedure is when the gov-
ernment can establish that the sole way to have accomplished its
purpose (be it criminal investigation or some other legitimate inter-
est) was to have acted immediately, and that obtaining a warrant
precluded immediate action.7'
furnishes no justification for a search of that place without a warrant." Agnello v. United
States, 269 U.S. 20, 33 (1925). Accord, United States v. McCormick, 15 CRaM. L. REP. 2433
(9th Cir. July 17, 1974), where the court observed that the government must establish exigent
circumstances and "probable cause alone does not justify a warrantless seizure." Id. at 2433.
70. 387 U.S. 523, 533 (1967).
71. The requirement of either a warrant or impending failure of purpose before a search is
conducted has been stated as follows: "We emphasize that no matter who the officer is or
what his mission, a government official cannot invade a private home, unless (1) a magistrate
has authorized him to do so or (2) an immediate major crisis in the performance of duty
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Under the warrant clause, a court has a much narrower question
before it than would be the case if warrantless searches were to be
judged solely by the standard of reasonableness. Under the reason-
ableness test a court is free to consider and weigh a multitude of
factors, including the purpose of a search. The court would be free
to attach greater weight to a search to protect life than to a search
for evidence. The question of how much weight to attach to the
various factors is uncertain and apparently arbitrary. Under the
warrant clause the court does not have this broad discretion, but
must address the narrower question of whether there was time to
obtain a warrant before the government officials acted. Thus if the
primacy of the warrant clause is accepted, there is no need to distin-
guish an emergency search from an emergency intrusion. The pur-
pose of the search is not relevant, but rather the relevant issue for
every type of warrantless search is the effect of a time delay to
obtain a warrant.
III. Is THE PURPOSE OF THE INTRUSION RELEVANT IN DETERMINING
WHETHER THE INTRUSION IS AN EXCEPTION TO THE WARRANT
CLAUSE OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT?
Accepting the view that the warrant clause applies to all intru-
sions upon privacy does not mean that a warrantless search is never
constitutional. It only means that when it is practical to do so the
police must obtain a warrant before conducting a search.72 There are
''a few specifically established and well-delineated" situations
where it is not practical to obtain a warrant.3 In addition to these
established exceptions, there is the general exception of emergency,
which states that it is not practical to obtain a warrant when the
warrant procedure would frustrate the purpose of the search. As
discussed earlier the only way to frustrate the purpose of a search
is if in the time required to obtain a search warrant, some event
affords neither time nor opportunity to apply to a magistrate." District of Columbia v. Little,
178 F.2d 13, 17 (D.C. Cir. 1949), aff'd, 339 U.S. 1 (1950).
72. "In cases where the securing of a warrant is reasonably practicable, it must be used
.... " Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 156 (1925). "The police must, whenever
practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant
procedure . . . ." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968).
73. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1971). These exceptions, which are
"jealously and carefully drawn," are listed supra note 4.
74. See text accompanying notes 67-71 supra.
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(e.g., destruction of sought after evidence, or loss of an imperiled
life) will occur which will make the search fruitless. 5 If the police
can establish that there is a legitimate reason for searching, and can
also establish that the reason will be eliminated before a warrant
can be obtained, they have shown a true emergency and may act
without a warrant.
In determining whether the delay to obtain a warrant will frus-
trate the purpose of the search, the courts have traditionally consid-
ered three factors: (1) the time required to obtain a warrant; (2) the
time required to frustrate the search by destroying or altering the
object of the search; and (3) the likelihood that the destruction or
alteration will take place.76 These three factors must be identified
and evaluated in terms of probabilities, since there are only rare
situations where one or more of the factors can be established to any
degree of certainty. One such situation arose in Schmerber v.
California,77 where the police sought a blood sample to test the
alcohol content of the suspect's blood. Since alcohol is absorbed by
the blood system, there was no need for an affirmative act to destroy
the desired evidence. The police knew that the evidence was pres-
ently being destroyed through the mere passage of time, and the
only uncertainty was how much time remained before the destruc-
tion would be complete. In most situations, however, the object of
75. This exception was recognized in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), where the Court
noted that: "We deal here with an entire rubric of police conduct-necessarily swift action
predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of the officer on the beat-which historically
has not been, and as a practical matter could not be, subjected to the warrant procedure."
Id. at 20 (emphasis added). Of course, it is possible to frustrate the purpose of a search by
having the magistrate deny the issuance of a search warrant, i.e., make a determination that
there is not probable cause to search. In such a situation, however, an unconstitutional search
has been frustrated, and this is one of the proper functions of the fourth amendment. "In cases
where seizure is impossible except without warrant, the seizing officer acts unlawfully and
at his peril unless he can show the court [he has] probable cause." Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132, 156 (1925).
76. See Guzman v. Estelle, 493 F.2d 532 (5th Cir. 1974), where the court stated:
The Supreme Court has identified several factors that it considers exigent: (1) an
alerted criminal fleeing or likely to take flight; (2) contraband, stolen goods, or weap-
ons as the objects of the search; (3) lack of a prior opportunity for the defendant to
destroy incriminating evidence; (4) objects of the search that may be quickly and easily
removed or destroyed; (5) easy access of the criminal to the objects of the search; (6)
availability of confederates to aid the criminal in fleeing or in the destruction of the
objects of the search; and (7) lack of time in which the search warrant could have been
secured. Id. at 536-37 (citations omitted).
77. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
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the search is not self-destructing, and thus frustration of the result
is not inevitable. The usual situation is where an affirmative act is
required by some party to bring about the result (e.g., someone must
flush the heroin down the commode). In the usual situation where
the result is not inevitable, it is necessary to deal with probabilities
and not certainties. It cannot be known that if the police had sought
a warrant it would (versus could) have taken three hours, and the
purpose of the search would (versus could) have been frustrated in
two hours. In evaluating these probabilities, it is not clear what
standard of proof the government must meet." There have been
many suggestions as to the proper standard for establishing a true
emergency," and it is beyond the scope of this article to explore
these proposals. The concern here is whether there is a need to
distinguish an emergency intrusion from an emergency search so
that a lesser standard of proof can be applied to emergency intru-
sions where frustrating the purpose of the search means a possible
loss of life rather than a possible loss of incriminating evidence.
The argument for a lesser standard of proof for an emergency
intrusion urges that to the traditional relevant factors-(1) time to
obtain a warrant; (2) time to frustrate the search; and (3) likelihood
of frustration-must be added a fourth factor: (4) the nature of the
interest that will be frustrated by delay. Thus the argument pro-
ceeds: any delay to obtain a warrant causes some risk of frustrating
the search, and the risk society is willing to run is colored by the
purpose of the search. In order to protect the right to privacy, society
is willing to run a fairly high risk of frustrating the search when the
purpose is merely to obtain incriminating evidence. But society is
willing to run very little risk of frustrating a search when the pur-
pose is the preservation of life.8" In dealing with an emergency situa-
tion, where the purpose was to obtain incriminating evidence, the
78. It is clear that the burden of proof rests on the government. "The burden is on those
seeking the exemption [from the warrant clause of the fourth amendment] to show the need
for it. . . . " United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951).
79. For an analysis of the various proposals, see Comment, 1971 U. IL. L.F., 111.
80. This view was expounded in Davis v. State, 236 Md. 389, 204 A.2d 76 (1964), where
the court stated: 'The delay which would necessarily have resulted from an application for a
search warrant might have been the difference between life and death .... The preservation
of human life has been considered paramount to the constitutional demand of a search
warrant as a condition precedent to the invasion of the privacy of a dwelling house." 204 A.2d
at 80. Accord, Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 212 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (dictum).
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Supreme Court set the strict standard that an emergency exists only
when the actual destruction of the evidence is imminent.8 ' In deal-
ing with an emergency intrusion, then Judge Burger set a lower
standard for establishing an emergency: "When policemen, firemen
or other public officers are confronted with evidence which would
lead a prudent and reasonable official to see a need to act to protect
life or property, they are authorized to act on that information, even
if ultimately found erroneous. '' s2 Thus in an emergency search, the
strict standard of imminent destruction was applied, but in an
emergency intrusion the lesser standard of the reasonably prudent
man was applied.
The argument that a lower standard of proof is required to bypass
the warrant procedure in an emergency intrusion assumes that the
government interest in obtaining incriminating evidence is legiti-
mate, but somehow less legitimate or entitled to less weight, than
the government interest in protecting life. While there is a certain
emotional appeal in this approach, it is submitted that the differ-
ence in these two legitimate interests (protecting life and obtaining
evidence) is relevant only when determining the existence of prob-
able cause to search. The probable cause standard is flexible enough
to take account of the difference between an emergency search and
an emergency intrusion because although the right to privacy is
constitutionally protected, it is not an absolute right. The right to
privacy must be balanced against other legitimate interests, and the
balance can be struck at different points depending on whether the
right of privacy is weighed against the interest in obtaining incrimi-
nating evidence, or the interest in saving life. However, there is no
need for the same flexibility in the warrant requirement because its
function is not to balance conflicting interests, but to serve as a
limitation of police power by providing a procedure which assures
that the balancing of interests is performed by the judiciary. When
the police bypass the warrent clause and conduct a warrantless
search they thereby usurp the judicial function of determining when
the right of privacy can be set aside. The courts should be jealous
81. Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970). See also State v. Patterson, 220 N.W.2d 235
(Neb. 1974), where the court held that the police must establish that "there is great likelihood
that the evidence will be destroyed or removed before a warrant can be obtained . Id.
at 240.
82. Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 212 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (dictum).
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of this power and skeptical of the need of police to exercise the
power. Thus the standard of proof required to bypass the warrant
requirement should remain a strict standard and should not be
lowered because of the alleged benevolent purpose of the police in
conducting an emergency intrusion. "Experience should teach us to
be most on our guard to protect liberty when the Government's
purposes are beneficent. 8 3
CONCLUSION
The sole distinction between an emergency search and an emer-
gency intrusion is the government's purpose in breaching the right
of privacy. A benevolent government purpose (e.g., protection of
life) is said to justify intrusions upon the right of privacy that would
not be justified when the government's purpose is less benevolent
(e.g., quest for incriminating evidence). The justification may take
the form of urging that: (1) the benevolent purpose reduces what
would otherwise be a search to a non-search beyond the coverage of
the fourth amendment; (2) the benevolent purpose makes "reason-
able" an intrusion that might be unreasonable if the benevolent
purpose were absent; or (3) the benevolent purpose justifies a less
strict application of the warrant clause.
Although each justification must be analyzed in terms of the
aforementioned fourth amendment considerations, the basic ques-
tion underlying all three justifications is whether the motivation of
the intruding officer is a relevant. factor when interpreting the fourth
amendment. While "improper" motivation has been recognized as
a factor in declaring a search unconstitutional,84 there seems to be
little justification for applying the other side of the coin and reward-
ing a "noble" motive by lessening the protection of the fourth
amendment. "A paternalistic notion that a complaining citizen's
constitutional rights can be violated so long as the State is somehow
helping him is alien to our Nation's philosophy.""
83. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
84. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 469-70 n.26 (1971), where the Court
discusses the constitutionality of a "planned warrantless search."
85. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 343 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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